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The Impact of Prolonged Nomination Contests on Presidential Candidate 
Evaluations and General Election Vote Choice: The Case of 2008 
JEFF R. DEWITT 
Kennesaw State University 
RICHARD N. ENGSTROM 
Kennesaw State University 
The fact that political parties hold competitive nomination contests that require voters to choose 
among multiple candidates leaves open the possibility that the contest itself could damage the 
prospects of an eventual nominee. In this study, we employ ANES panel survey data from the 
2008 U.S. presidential election to assess the impact of the Democratic Party nomination process 
on candidate evaluations and general election vote preference. We find evidence that Barack 
Obama had greater difficulty uniting his party than his Republican counterpart due to the fact 
that Clinton voters were slow to coalesce around Obama. These supporters failed to report 
higher levels of favorability until Clinton conceded the race in the summer, while Huckabee and 
Romney voters were seen rallying to their party’s nominee in the spring. In the end, many 
Clinton primary voters either abstained from voting in November or crossed over to support the 
Republican nominee. 
Keywords: Parties, Elections, Campaigns, Voting Behavior, Public Opinion, Political Parties  
El hecho de que los partidos políticos realicen contiendas de nominaciones competitivas que 
exijan a los votantes elegir entre múltiples candidatos crea la posibilidad de que la contienda en 
sí misma perjudique las expectativas del candidato ganador. En este estudio, empleamos datos 
de una encuesta de ANES sobre las elecciones presidenciales del 2008 en los Estados Unidos 
para determinar el impacto del proceso de nominación presidencial del Partido Demócrata en 
la evaluación de los candidatos y las preferencias electorales generales. Encontramos evidencia 
de que Barack Obama tuvo una mayor dificultad unificando su partido que su equivalente 
Republicano debido a que partidarios de Clinton fueron lentos en sumarse a Obama. Estos 
partidarios no reportaron altos niveles de apoyo hasta que Clinton confirió la contienda en el 
verano, mientras que partidarios de Huckabee y Romney se concentraron en el candidato de su 
partido desde la primavera. Al final, muchos votantes adeptos a Clinton se abstuvieron de votar 
en noviembre o decidieron apoyar al candidato Republicano. 
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In the United States, presidential elections are the second round of a two-stage selection 
process that begins months earlier with a series of party primary elections and caucuses. During 
the primary stage, when Democratic and Republican candidates compete for their parties’ 
nominations, an inherent political risk rests in the fact that voters may find it difficult to shift 
their allegiances to the opponent of their preferred candidate for the general election. Most often, 
nomination battles are settled by mid-March, which presumably serves to resolve intra-party 
disputes well in advance of the general election campaign as parties use the remainder of the 
spring and summer to rally support around the nominee (Mayer and Busch 2003).  
However, the 2008 Democratic nomination contest provides a notable exception to the 
usual pattern (Burden 2009). It did not end quickly and failed to provide the Democrats with a 
seamless transition to the general election campaign. Indeed, the Barack Obama versus Hillary 
Clinton race was one of the most contentious primary contests in decades and some wondered 
whether the discord would extend all the way to November. As one observer noted, ―Hillary 
Rodham Clinton may still have a chance of winning the Democratic nomination. But it’s 
probably smaller than the chance that a continued slugfest will hand the White House to John 
McCain‖ (Kristof 2008). Obama did not officially clinch the Democratic nomination until June 
3, and it was not until June 7 that Clinton suspended her campaign. Even after the nomination 
contest was officially wrapped up, questions about Democratic party unity continued to linger 
(e.g., Tumulty 2009).  
In this study, we employ panel survey data from the 2008 U.S. presidential election to 
assess the impact of the prolonged Democratic Party’s nomination process on individuals’ 
candidate evaluations and general election vote preferences. We find evidence that Barack 
Obama had greater difficulty uniting his party than his Republican counterpart. This was due to 
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the fact that many Hillary Clinton primary voters were reluctant to shift their support to Obama, 
a challenge compounded by the shorter time period the Democratic nominee had to win them 
over. While it is true that Clinton primary voters were not initially pre-disposed to support 
Obama—they were only mildly approving of Obama at the start of the year—the shift in their 
electoral support toward Obama was delayed until the summer, while supporters of John 
McCain’s Republican rivals can be seen rallying around their party’s nominee as early as March.  
Ultimately, the delayed conclusion of the nomination contest led to a less-than-unified 
Democratic Party. The consequences of this prolonged party disunity are demonstrated in our 
finding that Clinton primary voters were no more likely to vote for Barack Obama in the general 
election than to not vote, or to vote for John McCain.  
Primaries and General Election Outcomes 
Taken at face value, a hard-fought presidential primary process would seem to be 
detrimental to that party’s chances of winning the general election in November. Numerous 
studies employing a variety of methodological techniques provide support for that conclusion 
(Lengle, Owen, and Sonner 1995; Lengle 1980; Kenney and Rice 1984, 1987; Hacker 1965). 
Atkeson (1998), however, finds that a party’s primary generates minimal impact on general 
election outcomes once crucial contextual factors for each election such as the state of the 
economy and the popularity of the incumbent president have been considered.  
Studies of lower-level elections lend support to the finding that primaries can damage the 
chances of nominees in the general election. In fact, the most prominent factor in determining 
success in the general election can also be understood as the factor that determines the level of 
competition for a primary nomination: incumbency. Incumbents face the fewest challengers for 
their party’s nomination, and are subsequently the most successful category of candidate running 
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in general elections (Stone and Maisel 2003; Lazarus 2005; Glaser 2005). An examination of 
congressional candidates and campaign managers by Ezra (2001) finds that competitive 
primaries may be especially damaging for certain kinds of candidates. In particular, those with a 
great deal of ―political capital‖ (experience, name recognition, campaign money, and 
organization) may suffer from a more heated primary battle. Candidates with little political 
capital, though, might even profit from the practice, exposure, and legitimacy that a hard fought 
primary campaign provides. 
While conventional academic wisdom holds that competitive primary campaigns bear 
important electoral implications, we know little about the impact of an extended primary 
campaign season. The longer the nomination contest drags on, the more time a party must 
dedicate to resolving intra-party conflict and the less time it may have to dedicate to unifying 
electoral support around the eventual nominee. Given the uniquely prolonged nomination battle 
and the abbreviated general electoral calendar in 2008, it is plausible that the nomination contest 
itself lessened the support the Democratic Party nominee was ultimately able to acquire in 
November. By tracking voter attitudes over time, we are able to determine how support for 
candidates pursuing the nomination changed, when those changes took place, and how these 
dynamics ultimately affected the general election vote. 
The 2008 Presidential Election 
The 2008 Democratic nomination contest serves as a useful case study for the theory that 
prolonged primaries effectively harm a party’s presidential nominee. The March 5, 2008 
headline, ―Clinton wins key primaries, CNN projects; McCain clinches nod,‖ illustrates the 
contrasting electoral dynamics between the two parties (CNN 2008). If a race that is marked by a 
heavily contested primary season that lasts until every state has cast its votes shows no effect on 
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the nominee’s ability to gain supporters and rally voters in November, where could one expect an 
effect? If prolonged presidential primaries harm party nominees, we would expect the 2008 race 
to produce a sizeable number of Clinton primary voters who find it difficult to approve of Obama 
at high levels and movement his way during the general election stage would be hindered by the 
shorter electoral calendar. Obama’s favorability among Democrats would be lower throughout 
the longer primary campaign while Republicans coalesce around their nominee.  
Ultimately, we should see larger numbers of Clinton primary votes either abstaining in 
November or voting for the Republican, John McCain. Of course, it is overly reductive to 
conclude that no harm was done to Obama’s prospects based simply on the fact that Obama went 
on to win the general election. It is plausible that the prolonged nomination contest issued a 
substantial blow, though not a fatal one, to Obama’s presidential chances. Perhaps he garnered 
less support, and fewer votes, than he would have if the transition from nomination to general 
stages had been more swift and seamless.  
Much has already been written about the historic 2008 election. Political science research 
has examined the impact of racial attitudes on voting decisions (Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau 
2010; Jackman and Vavreck 2010; Piston 2010), the role the war in Iraq played in the outcome 
(Jacobson 2010), and how partisanship shifts among voters may have worked in favor of the 
winning candidate (Winneg and Jamieson 2010). Several studies have also explored the impact 
of the Democratic Party contest on how people voted in the general election. Southwell (2010), 
for example, examines whether Hillary Clinton supporters were more likely to stay home on 
Election Day or defect to the Republican candidate rather than cast a ballot for their preferred 
candidate's intra-party rival. Though Southwell notes that significant numbers of Clinton voters 
flipped to John McCain in November, she concludes that the nomination battle was probably not 
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to blame.
1
 Similarly, Henderson et al. (2010) examine whether or not ―sour grapes‖ left over 
from the primary prompted many Clinton voters to defect to McCain. They find that ideology 
and policy preferences were actually more important factors than any negative fallout from the 
divisive primary process.  
Studies such as those mentioned above explore the ultimate electoral damage that 
primaries can cause to nominees based on whether or not voters shift their support to the chief 
partisan rivals of most preferred candidates. They assume that support for a particular party 
candidate also reflects opposition to the alternatives.
2
 This may not be the case. Rather than 
assume that voters who prefer candidate A would prefer that candidate B not be elected, we 
acknowledge that primary voters and caucus participants may be expressing their preferences for 
one candidate among several candidates (in both parties) whom they could potentially support at 
any point during the campaign season. As such, in this study, we explore the longitudinal trends 
in levels of support for both the Democratic and Republican nominees independently and also 
relative to one another among various groupings of primary voters. In doing so, we are better 
able to illustrate linkages between presidential primaries and the dynamic nature of candidate 
evaluations over the course of an entire election season.  
Moreover, it is important to note that predicting a change in political behavior among 
partisan voters is a very ―high bar.‖ Primary voters are some of the most reliably active, partisan 
electoral participants (Norrander 1986). It is also well established that presidential candidates 
tend to pursue a self-interest-maximizing, ―securing the base first‖ general election strategy 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, Southwell (2010) finds that John Edwards voters were statistically similar to Clinton voters in their 
tendency to support John McCain, which suggests that the consequences of prolonged primary contests do not 
necessarily build resentment over an extended period of time.  
2
 Numerous analysts highlighted the seemingly vast differences between Clinton supporters and Obama supporters 
(see e.g., Newport 2008; Sussman 2008). 
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(Peress 2010), often taking these voters for granted as the two parties converge around the 
median voter after nominations are achieved. Other scholarship has suggested a ―neo-Downsian‖ 
electoral trend, characterized by partisan divergence (Grofman 2005), whereby political 
candidates, especially the 2008 nominees, are prone to assume positions ―closer to their median 
voter in their respective parties than to the national voter median‖ (Jesse 2010, 205). As such, for 
this group of voters to alter its typically firm general election support would be extremely 
noteworthy and the circumstances leading to such changes are worth investigation. Given this 
theoretical context, we expect to find that Barack Obama had greater difficulty uniting his party 
than his Republican counterpart. Our working hypotheses are twofold. First, due to the prolonged 
Democratic Party primary, Clinton voters will be slow to coalesce around Obama while 
Huckabee and Romney voters will be seen rallying to their party’s nominee in the spring. 
Second, in the end, many Clinton primary voters will either abstain from voting in November or 
cross over to support the Republican nominee.  
Data and Methods 
Most academic investigations of presidential primaries have relied on Election Day vote 
tallies and aggregate polling data. Distributional measures and independent cross-sectional 
surveys are employed, with results interpreted to reveal the broad level impact of contentious 
nomination contests. This study, in contrast, uses 2008 panel data compiled by the American 
National Election Study to provide a more focused presentation of the electoral dynamics 
embedded within the context of a single election year.
 
Panel data are especially useful in that 
they provide us with the opportunity to study how a consistent set of respondents changed 
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attitudinally and behaviorally over time.
3
 In that respect, our methodological model mirrors 
Hillygus’s examination of individual-level dynamics during the 2000 presidential election.  
The 2008 dataset, in particular, includes a representative sample of respondents who 
answered questions at multiple points over the course of the primary and general election 
seasons. 
4
 Our principal focus is on seven-point candidate favorability scores across five panel 
waves—January, February, June, September, and October—in addition to a post-election 
candidate preference variable. We present descriptive analyses and regression models which 
highlight longitudinal trends in electoral judgments regarding the party nominees (Barack 
Obama and John McCain) among voters who supported them and their principal rivals (Hillary 
Clinton, Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney) in the presidential primaries.
5
  
Fallout from a primary season may produce voters who are more or less supportive of the 
nominee at various points during the campaign and may either refrain from participating in the 
November general election, as a reflection of ―abstention due to alienation‖ (Brody and Page 
1973; Adams and Merrill 2003), or even cross over to cast ballots for the opposing party 
candidate as a ―sour grapes‖ protest against the nominee (see Henderson et al. 2010). Analyses 
presented here examine support for Obama and McCain in light of these scenarios. We assess 
whether or not changes in the level of favorability for Obama are related to voting for Hillary 
Clinton in the primaries, placing special emphasis on the extended nature of Democratic 
                                                 
3
 See Bartels (1999) for a summary of the advantages of panel data and Miller (1999) for a discussion of the utility 
of panels for clarifying judgmental relationships.  
4
 The 2008-2009 ANES employed a telephone recruited internet panel which answered political questions in 
January, February, June, September, October, and November 2008. The overall response rate was 42 percent. Panel 
weights are used in order to help correct for panel attrition. Our working dataset, which does not include the second 
cohort added in September, is comprised of 1623 cases. For more information on the dataset, please see ANES 
documentation at http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2008_2009panel/anes2008_2009panel.htm. 
5
 Hillary Clinton voters are represented in a single, stand-alone category. Huckabee and Romney voters are merged 
into a common category of Republican contenders.  
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nomination campaign. McCain’s numbers serve as a useful baseline for comparison purposes 
since the Republican nomination contest followed a relatively conventional form.  
Findings 
If Hillary Clinton’s decision to continue campaigning against Barack Obama negatively 
impacted support for Barack Obama, and hindered his ability to unify the party, we should see 
the favorability scores of Obama remain low, or even decrease, over the course of the prolonged 
primary contest. Figure 1 tracks the average panel respondent placement of Barack Obama on a 
seven-point favorability scale. Indeed, during the first six months of 2008, the entire course of 
the protracted nomination contest, Obama’s scores remained almost perfectly flat among those 
who preferred Clinton, increasing only .12 (from 4.49 in January to 4.61 in June). While his 
favorables with this group finally began inching upward after the Democratic contest concluded 
with Clinton’s concession and endorsement in early June and her August 28 DNC convention 
speech in which she proclaimed that she was a ―proud supporter of Barack Obama‖ (from 4.61 in 
June to 4.97 in September), they never moved much beyond the score of five.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 displays longitudinal trends for John McCain, which are quite different than 
those for his Democratic counterpart. Initially, McCain’s favorability scores among Mike 
Huckabee and Mitt Romney voters hovered around his overall score (4.69 versus 4.63). After his 
two rivals’ concessions and endorsements,6 however, support for McCain increased for this 
group, even as the general public and McCain primary voters grew less favorable. Clearly, by 
June, Romney and Huckabee voters had begun rallying around the party’s nominee, as would 
seem to be the conventional track. By September, their approval of McCain had improved by 
                                                 
6
 John McCain effectively claimed the Republican nomination with Romney’s withdrawal from the race on February 
7, 2008. Huckabee dropped out on March 4. 
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nearly a full point, to 5.59 on the seven-point scale. This steady positive movement on the part of 
Republican primary voters indicates that McCain wielded an impressive electoral advantage in 
his effort to unify the GOP, especially considering that Clinton primary voters were slow to 
coalesce around Obama.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In Tables 1 and 2, we present results from a series of OLS regression equations that 
further explore the impact of primary candidate preference and the prolonged Democratic 
nomination contest on electoral support over the course of the 2008 presidential campaign. The 
dependent variables are favorability scores for the two party nominees at each of the five panel 
wave data points. As indicated in Table 1, being a Clinton primary voter significantly decreased 
support for of Obama in January (b = -1.06) and February (b = -.51), after controlling for party 
and the favorability score provided by the respondent in the previous wave. In fact, at no time 
did supporting Clinton produce significantly higher favorability rating for Obama. This was true 
even after her concession, endorsement, and convention speech, which strongly encouraged party 
unity.  
To further confirm the proposition that Clinton primary voters were slow to shift their 
support to Obama, we ran an additional OLS regression model in which we used Obama 
favorability at each given wave as the dependent variable. In addition to controls for party 
affiliation and a lagged variable representing the respondent’s Obama favorability score in the 
previous wave, we introduced a dummy variable to distinguish cases collected after the June 
wave, and interacted it with the ―Clinton primary voter‖ variable. As expected, results reveal that 
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Clinton voters were significantly more likely to support Obama after June than they were 
before.
7
 
The McCain model, presented in Table 2, depicts a contrasting electoral narrative. Data 
show no significant early effects of supporting one of his key rivals (Huckabee or Romney) in 
the primary but that factor increased McCain’s favorability in June (b=.25) and September (b = 
.25), after controlling for effect of Republican partisanship and the earlier favorability score. 
Candidate impressions appear to have crystallized by the October measurement, resulting in 
insignificant coefficients in both models. Since both models include a lagged dependent variable, 
the insignificant coefficient suggests that favorability scores were not changing for these groups 
as election day approached.
8
  
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Ultimately, voting is about choices among or between competing electoral options. 
Voters do not generally express a simple like or dislike for one candidate but consider each 
candidate relative to others. They employ comparative candidate evaluations (Rahn, Krosnick, 
and Breuning 1990; Rahn et al. 1994). As such, Figure 3 charts the net difference between 
Obama and McCain favorability scores over the course of the primary and general election 
seasons. Higher scores reflect greater support for Obama; lower scores reflect greater support for 
McCain. Once again, data reveal dramatic differences between the two parties. First, note the 
initial relative position of Obama and McCain among Clinton voters, which reflects no 
significant difference between the likeability of Barack Obama and John McCain (.09). While 
assessments of the Democratic nominee improve somewhat over time, they do not rise to the 
                                                 
7
 Results are available from the authors upon request.  
8
 This finding echoes researchers who have argued that shifts in voter judgments near election day are largely ―near 
random‖ reactions to ―mixed message‖ information flows rather than a reflection of real changes in opinion 
(Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous 1994; Nir and Druckman 2007).  
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levels of relative support expressed by Obama supporters or Democrats overall. Those who voted 
for McCain’s primary rivals (Huckabee and Romney), however, already prefer McCain to 
Obama by a substantial degree in January (-1.11). By June, this group expressed higher 
favorability scores for McCain (-2.2) than Republicans in general (2.1). In September, 
Huckabee-Romney voters were more favorable toward McCain than those who supported his 
nomination bid (2.95 versus 2.7). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Longitudinal trends in Figure 3 reveal the clear contrast between a unified party 
(Republicans) and a party marked by disunity (Democrats) in 2008. In particular, we track how 
much improvement candidates made with various sub-groupings of primary voters, including 
partisans and those who voted for key rivals, and thereby foreshadow the level of potential party 
unity or defection to come in November. Over the course of the entire campaign, John McCain 
was able to improve his differential scores among Huckabee/Romney voters from 1.11 in 
January to 2.81 in October—a total of 1.70 points. Obama was able to move Hillary voters by a 
slightly smaller amount, from .08 to 1.68—a total of 1.6 points. This late surge toward Obama 
represents a remarkable .52 improvement from September to October. Clinton voters reached a 
net favorable high for Obama in October but Huckabee/Romney voters had far surpassed that 
level of net favorable for McCain by June (-2.11). The practical result would be a dramatically 
less unified Democratic party going into the general election vote, with less time available for 
Obama to close the gap.  
Table 3 presents the results from regression models predicting candidate favorability 
differential between Obama and McCain for the five panel wave data points. Interestingly, 
negative coefficients for Clinton voters in January (b = -1.14) and February (b = -.65) indicate 
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that they were actually more favorable toward McCain when considered relative to Obama. Also, 
echoing the candidate-specific findings, Huckabee/Romney voters were more positive about the 
Republican nominee when considered alongside the Democrat in June (b = -.51) and September 
(b = -.68). The larger adjusted R2 values, ranging from .21 to .80, indicate superior model fit.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Analyses of self-reported general election votes further illuminate the challenges Obama 
faced in unifying Democrats and former supporters of his key rival. Table 4 provides a 
breakdown of candidate preferences and turnout among those who supported opponents of the 
eventual party nominee. Most importantly, three times more Clinton primary voters crossed party 
lines to vote for McCain in November than Huckabee/Romney voters who defected to Obama 
(19 percent versus 5 percent). We find no initial support for the turnout hypothesis since a 
roughly equivalent number from both sides stayed home on Election Day. Nonetheless, these 
numbers reinforce the stark general electoral picture for Obama, as Clinton voters were more 
prone to support his opponent, crossing party lines in the process.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
We further clarify individual-level electoral dynamics with a pair of multinomial logit 
(MNL) regression models which estimate the 2008 presidential vote with a three-way outcome: 
vote for Obama, vote for McCain, and did not vote.
9
 Key independent variables include those 
that represent primary election vote preference and conventional, political, and demographic 
controls are also included.
10
 Results are presented in Table 5.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
9
 Similar MNL modeling techniques have been employed by Bélanger et al. (2006), Gold (2002) and Green and 
Harris (2007).  
10
 See Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Note that MNL coefficients are properly interpreted in terms of relative effects. Since the 
reference category in Model A is ―not voting‖ in the 2008 General Election, positive coefficients 
indicate that respondents are more likely to vote for Obama or vote for McCain as compared to 
not voting. Results show that being a Clinton primary supporter did not make one significantly 
more likely to vote for Obama, as opposed to abstaining on Election Day (b = .33). Self-
identified partisan Democrats are more likely to turn out and vote Obama (b = 2.10). These 
findings support the turnout hypothesis. Being a Clinton supporter did not improve a 
respondent’s likelihood of voting on election day. In contrast, Huckabee/Romney primary 
supporters are more likely to vote for McCain than not voting (b = 1.42) as are Republicans (b = 
1.83).  
Model B tests the head-to-head contest between the two party nominees whereby positive 
coefficients indicate a greater likelihood of voting for McCain as compared to voting for Obama. 
Findings reveal that being a Clinton voter does not significantly improve the chances of 
supporting her former Democratic rival. Being a Huckabee/Romney primary voter, however, 
significantly increases the likelihood of supporting McCain (b = 1.45). Results for self-identified 
partisans are as expected. Republicans are more likely to vote for McCain (b = 1.87) and 
Democrats are more likely to vote for Obama (b = -2.0). These findings support the hypothesis 
that, in November 2008, the Republicans behaved as an electorally unified party while 
Democrats were still hindered by the primary battle.  
Conclusion 
Several years ago, Holbrook (1994) highlighted a significant gap in the literature on 
electoral behavior. ―Every four years the U.S. public goes through the ritual of a presidential 
election campaign. For all of the drama and attention afforded these campaigns, little is known 
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about the dynamics of public opinion during a campaign season‖ (973). Wlezien and Erikson 
(2002, 969-70) also noted how ―scholars are only beginning to understand the evolution of 
election sentiment over time.‖ 
The 2008 Democratic nomination contest presents an opportunity to trace shifting public 
attitudes during a single election year and, in doing so, to test the notion that extended 
presidential primary processes harm nominees in the general election. Findings presented in this 
article suggest that prolonged presidential primaries create problems for a party’s nominee in the 
general election. Clinton primary voters only began moving their support Obama well into the 
summer, after the prolonged nomination campaign ended. This was roughly three months after 
supporters of McCain’s key primary rivals began the process of coalescing around the 
Republican nominee. Clinton supporters were not particularly likely to turn out in the general 
election, and those who did vote were not necessarily inclined to vote for the Democratic 
nominee. It is apparent that lower levels of support for Obama among Clinton voters reflected 
the damage produced from the prolonged campaign effort, and effectively prevented the 
Democratic Party from fully uniting around their nominee in the general election. Had Obama 
been given more time to unify the party, he may have been able to continue the trend of 
improving favorability among Clinton primary voters and enjoyed the electoral benefits on 
Election Day in November.  
 There is still much to learn about the consequences of prolonged presidential primary 
elections. Beyond the immediate electoral implications, it is possible that they could produce 
other more long-term consequences. Some observers have questioned whether the ―Obama 
versus Clinton‖ intra-party contest would spill into the next presidential election cycle (Newport 
2010; Rothman 2010). An extended nomination battle may also impact upon a newly elected 
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president’s honeymoon period, the amount of policy support a president receives over the course 
of his administration, and other issues related to the president’s role in democratic governance. A 
protracted primary contest may also cultivate more motivated, registered partisans in more states, 
strengthening party organizations and benefiting that party in the general election campaign 
(Associated Press 2008).  
 The analyses in this study also suggest that states moving their primary dates forward 
may have an impact beyond increasing a particular state’s influence on the selection of 
nominees. Front-loading, by shortening the primary campaign season, may help political parties 
consolidate support for the nominee in advance of the convention. How parties manage the 
timing of the presidential nomination process, it seems, can have implications for who wins in 
November.  
16 
 
Appendix 
Variables and Descriptions 
Obama Favorability is a seven-point like-dislike scale, with 1 being ―dislike a great deal‖ and 7 
being ―like a great deal‖. 
 
McCain Favorability is a seven-point like-dislike scale, with 1 being ―dislike a great deal‖ and 7 
being ―like a great deal‖. 
 
Favorability T-1
 represents the respondent’s score on a seven-point like-dislike scale, with 1 being 
―dislike a great deal‖ and 7 being ―like a great deal,‖ in the previous panel wave. 
 
Clinton Voter is a dichotomous (0-1) measure that represents self-reported voting for Hillary 
Clinton in the primaries. 
 
Huckabee/ Romney Voter is a dichotomous (0-1) measure that represents self-reported voting for 
either Mike Huckabee or Mitt Romney in the primaries. 
 
Age represents self-reported age on general election day. 
 
Democrat is a dichotomous (0-1) measure that represents self-reported affiliation with the 
Democratic Party at wave 10. 
 
Republican is a dichotomous (0-1) measure that represents self-reported affiliation with the 
Republican Party at wave 10. 
 
Female is a dichotomous (0-1) measure that represents being a female. 
 
Ideology is a seven-point ideology scale, with 1 being ―extremely liberal" and 7 being "extremely 
conservative" as self-reported at wave 10. 
 
Education is a five-point education level scale, with 1 being no high school diploma and 5 being 
graduate degree. 
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  Figure 1. Obama Favorability, January through October  
 
 
Figure 2. McCain Favorability, January through October  
 
 
Notes: Lines in above tables represent average favorability scores on a seven-point scale (with 1 being ―dislike a 
great deal‖ and 7 being ―like a great deal‖). Data are collected during the five panel wave months with other points 
imputed in order to preserve scale.  
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Table 1. Predicting Obama Favorability 
 
Independent Variables January February June September October 
      
Constant 4.04*** 1.40*** .63*** .83*** .73*** 
 (.06) (.07) (.11) (.08) (.07) 
Obama Favorability T-1 -- .69*** .70*** .79*** .77*** 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Democrat 1.55*** .59*** 1.06*** .45*** .67*** 
 (.10) (.07) (.09) (.08) (.08) 
Clinton Voter -1.06*** -.51*** -.21 .15 -.12 
 (.15) (.10) (.12) (.10) (.09) 
      
Adjusted R2 .14 .61 .58 .70 .76 
(N) 1390 1378 1262 1169 1150 
 
 
 
Table 2. Predicting McCain Favorability 
 
Independent Variables January February June September October 
      
Constant 4.15*** 1.49*** 1.12*** 1.21*** .98*** 
 (.50) (.10) (.11) (.10) (.08) 
McCain Favorability T-1 -- .60*** .59*** .68*** .67*** 
  (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) 
Republican .99*** .54*** .95*** .77*** .71*** 
 (.09) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.08) 
Huckabee /Romney Voter -.28 -.09 .25* .44** -.10 
 (.15) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
      
Adjusted R2 .08 .43 .46 .56 .64 
(N) 1386 1378 1296 1169 1143 
 
Notes: Cell entries in the above tables are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
―Favorability T-1‖ represents the favorability score provided for the candidate in the previous panel wave.    
 
* p = .05, ** p = .01, ***p = .001  
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Figure 3. Obama - McCain Favorability Differential, January Through October 
Notes: Lines represent average candidate favorability differential scores (Obama minus McCain) on a seven-point 
scale (with 1 being ―dislike a great deal‖ and 7 being ―like a great deal‖). Data are collected during the five panel 
wave months with other points imputed in order to preserve scale. 
 
Table 3. Predicting Candidate Favorability Differential (Obama – McCain) 
 
Independent Variable January February June September October 
      
Constant .19 .37*** -.09*** .14*** .28*** 
 (.11) (.09) (.10) (.11) (.11) 
Obama – McCain T-1 -- .69*** .65*** .84*** .77*** 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Republican -1.43*** -.65*** -.99*** -.74*** -.75*** 
 (.15) (.13) (.14) (.14) (.14) 
Huckabee / Romney Voter -.19 -.18 -.51* -.68*** -.03 
 (.22) (.18) (.19) (.18) (.16) 
Democrat 1.30*** .73*** 1.29*** .24 .53*** 
 (.15) (.13) (.14) (.15) (.14) 
Clinton Voter -1.14*** -.65*** -.18 -.11 -.09 
 (.19) (.15) (.17) (.16) (.14) 
      
Adjusted R2 .21 .57 .63 .73 .80 
(N) 1381 1371 1255 1167 1148 
 
Notes: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. ―Obama-McCain T-1‖ 
represents the candidate favorability differential score provided in the previous panel wave. * p = .05, ** p = .01, 
***p = .001  
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Table 4. General Election Preference and Turnout,Among Supporters of Primary 
Opponents 
 
 
General Election Vote Clinton Voters Huckabee / Romney Voters 
For Obama  74%  5%  
For McCain  19% 89%  
Did not vote  7%  6%  
(N) 206 135 
 
    Cell entries represent the percentage of voters in each category. 
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Table 5. Multinomial Logit Estimates of 2008 General Election Vote 
 
 Model A: Did Not Vote Model B: Vote Obama 
Independent Variable Vote Obama Vote McCain Vote McCain 
Constant -.55 .85 1.40 
 (.87) (.81) (.84) 
Age .02*** .04*** .01* 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Female .09 .12 .03 
 (.19) (.19) (.19) 
Education  .56*** .20* -.36*** 
 (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Income .03 .03 .01 
 (.02) (.02) (.03) 
White -.04 .87*** .91*** 
 (.21) (.24) (.24) 
Democrat 2.10*** .17 -2.0*** 
 (.23) (.27) (.26) 
Republican  -.04 1.83*** 1.87*** 
 (.32) (.26) (.31) 
Ideology  -.14*** .09 .23*** 
 (.02) (.81) (.05) 
Clinton Voter .33 .58 .25 
 (.29) (.34) (.27) 
Huckabee/Romney Voter  .03 1.42** 1.45** 
 .60 .46 .50 
    
Log pseudo likelihood 2540.1 2540.1 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) .60 
1206 
.60 
(N) 1206 
 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized multinomial logit regression coefficients. ―Did not vote in the 2008 General 
Election‖ serves as the reference category for Model A. ―General Election vote for Obama‖ serves as the reference 
for Model B. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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